As noted by j. Translation software takes a slightly different approach. Bruner (1986) humans operate in two modes of ((thought, two forms, always complementary and irreducible, organize experience and constructing reality: 1) thinking logical, systematic, which we use to solve problems and whereby we propose hypotheses and make checks, and 2) the narrative thinking, by which we sort and give meaning to the acts of human life in such a way of giving sense to the experience of living it. The contents and structural relationships of each personal narrative should allow the maintenance of an internal systemic coherence that is experienced by the individual as a viable identity continuity. For a system of autonomous, self-organised and self-referential knowledge as human personal system, maintaining a sense of identity is the fundamental autoorganizativa invariant. Lose your sense of identity means the disintegration, the loss of reality, the most devastating of human experiences (Guidano, 1987). Another feature of this narrative is his character historical and, therefore, peculiar and unique. A conscious system as ours looks exposed to knowledge of death itself and the experience of the break in the symmetry of time, which transforms us into a system aware of its irreversibility, forced to experience an ortogenetica progression (Prigogine, 1988;) Guidano, 1987, 1991). In other words, knowing our own finitude compels us to achieve increasingly integrated and complex of self-referral structural order levels that allow us to in every instance transform into a temporary order internal, subjective, narrativamente consistent, the cluster of disturbances to which we are exposed on a permanent basis. Thus, the perception of the irreversible directionality of the own time spent is inherent in the condition of human experience and is always present as a fundamental variable for the structuring of personal identity. The self arises to differentiate me from others and the world, in the Act of observing my own subjectivity, in the distinction that I do it; and this self, as every object that I distinguish, takes on a meaning for me.